THE NEW EXPERIMENTALISM AND THE VALUE OF EXPERIMENTAL JUSTIFICATION IN EMPIRICAL SCIENCES

Mieczysław Bombik

doi:10.21697/spch.2020.56.S2.02

Published: 2020-12-31

Vol. 56 No. S2 (2020)

THE NEW EXPERIMENTALISM AND THE VALUE OF EXPERIMENTAL JUSTIFICATION IN EMPIRICAL SCIENCES

Mieczysław Bombik

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

Section: Papers

https://doi.org/10.21697/spch.2020.56.S2.02

Abstract

This article briefly presents and characterizes a relatively young (nineteen-nineties) trend in methodology, the theory of science – and philosophy, called “the new experimentalism”. The fundamental problem is determined by the question about the value of the new experimentalism and experimental grounds of scientific knowledge in empirical sciences. In the first part of the article, the previous (old) experimentalism is presented. First of all, the history of the experimental method is outlined and the definitions of experiment, object, phenomenon, and of the carried out and analyzed observation are provided. It is shown why the main proposition of experimentalists – “determining a fact based on sensory experience” is fallacious. The second part describes the way in which the representatives of the new experimentalism try to identify and characterize those factors of an experiment that guarantee the objectivity of its result; demonstrate that results are not only determined by psychological, historical, sociological or economic factors but also that they exist in nature as real objects and events. A correct and reliable analysis of the experiment and its results may – according to the new experimentalists – contribute to this conclusion. Therefore, the important role and value of the experimental foundation of social activity in general, and in particular, for the natural sciences, is rightly noted.

Keywords:

new experimentalism, natural sciences, scientific cognition, theory

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Bombik, M. (2020). THE NEW EXPERIMENTALISM AND THE VALUE OF EXPERIMENTAL JUSTIFICATION IN EMPIRICAL SCIENCES. Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 56(S2), 23–62. https://doi.org/10.21697/spch.2020.56.S2.02

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