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ANTINOMIES OF MYTHOLOGICAL RELIGION;
SOME REMARKS ON THE MARGIN OF CZESLAW
MIŁOSZ’S “TRAKTAT TEOLOGICZNY” (“TREATISE
ON THEOLOGY”)

I wrote this poem while searching for a language in which religion
could be discussed. The accepted, devotional language often poses
obstacles in this field, while the language of theology seems to me
to have too many words. At the same time it is a poem about my
search for my cultural identity. Its important components are my
Roman Catholicism and my upbringing in Wilno [Vilnius], that is
my reluctance to connect religion with ethnocentric consciousness.
Here, it is Mickiewicz who is of help for me, Mickiewicz who was
still partly free from his later, post-partition deformations and in his
reading (Jakob Boehme, Claude de St.Martin) belonged to the Age
of Enlightenment, and particularly to its unofficial, hermetic streak.
I have sometimes mentioned the fact that when I read Mickiewicz’s
Zdania i uwagi (Sentences and Remarks) I feel as if I was returning
home and that I find there a hidden idea later present in Pan Tadeusz
(Sir Thaddeus). My poem is an attempt to save Mickiewicz from
banality, which he, the bard and the prophet, has accumulated. And
to reinstate the mystery of his writings.

Despite this important auto-commentary of Miłosz to his text,
I am still convinced that the main problem with reading his “Treatise
on Theology” is the unclear intention of the author. At least two
possibilities of reading this communiqué exist.

The first suggests that Miłosz, while constructing his poem, is
using the mode of first person personal lyric poetry to express his position
as to religious dogma, but that its first person mode has turned the presentation of his position into a confession, which can hardly be treated as a discursive text, which makes “Treatise on Theology”, despite the term ‘treatise’, not a subject for theological discussion but for literary criticism. In other words, if one wanted to argue with the theses of “Treatise on Theology”, one would be breaking generic rules, turning it from a non-discursive utterance into an utterance which requires a transmission of ideas from the narrative persona to the author of the text. Such an approach shows the lack of understanding of conventions which were used in “Treatise on Theology” and, in fact, does more harm than good.

The second option is that Milosz’s text has the dimension (in spite of the appearance of the lyrical first person) of deconstruction of a certain religious stance, which achieves its status independently from the author, and, what is more, the attitude of the author to it is clearly ambivalent. When we accept such a possibility of reading this text, we will be able—by using Milosz’s poem—to describe such a stance. Then we can enter into a dialogue with it, but mostly we can treat Milosz’s poem as, perhaps not totally objective, but nevertheless still characteristic of a certain stance (which, by the way, is not so unambiguous as Milosz’s critics would like to see it).”

In this paper I will stick to the latter of reading strategies, because it makes possible a discussion about what Milosz has to say about religion and its place in the life of contemporary man. A different strategy (incidentally it seems that Milosz himself encourages us to adopt it in his commentary; the key to which is the existential projection of religious problems onto biography; see, for example, an anthology Metafizyczna pauza (The Metaphysical Pause) is limited to describing Milosz’s views and either to showing their evolution

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1 “Traktat teologiczny” (“Treatise on Theology”) was published for the first time in Tygodnik Powszechny in 2001. [Kontrapunkt. Magazyn Kulturalny Tygodnika Powszechnego”, nr 11–12 (60/61), 25 listopada 2001]. The text itself was preceded by introductory essays written by: Ireneusz Kania, Aleksander Piot, Marian Stal, Jan Bloński and rev. Adam Boniecki.
within the huge oeuvre of Miłosz or to showing specific places (loci) in his writings, without going deep into these views and starting a polemics with them: "Miłosz said", "Miłosz claimed", "Miłosz suggested", "Miłosz opposed...". Bizarre examples of such type of texts are various enunciations about Miłosz by Adam Michnik, such as the text which opened celebrations of the Year of Czesław Miłosz entitled “Rozpacz Miłosza” ("Miłosz’s Despair") which was given the following blurb by editors:

He was saving Polish spirituality from falsification and treason, from blindness of mind and banality of clichés, from fanaticism and cynicism, from cruelty and surrender in the face of cruelty.

Therefore, it seems obvious to me that it is worth (even if only for cognitive reasons) taking the second option of reading “A Treatise on Theology”. Several theses can be presented from this perspective. For example:

The treatise is, in my conviction, the boldest critique, in Polish poetry of the last decades, of mythological religion, presented in the form of a story of one man (the lyric 'I') who undergoes transformation from the world of myths to the real world.

The treatise 'creates respect', especially with these fragments which boldly present the role of poetry in human life:

Why theology? Because the first must be first. And first is a notion of truth. It is poetry, precisely.
With its behavior of a bird thrashing against the transparency
A windowpane that testifies to the fact
That we don’t know how to live in a phantasmagoria.²

This fragment is one of the most important challenges of our time; the adjuration is so important as it is made by an Old Poet, whose place in Polish literature is unique and extremely privileged.

Who is this Old Poet portrayed by Miłosz in “Treatise on Theology”, who is He, who calls for the return to the reality of art, and who calls for an “absolute point of reference?”

He is the one who voices an opinion which certainly could be met enthusiastically by conservatives:

The louts grimaced sarcastically
As they discussed my pious, childish superstitions.

Which did not want to accept the only knowledge
Accessible to us: that people are created by people,
And that they, together, create something that they call truth.³

However, this “pious child” does not stand in front of “little girls dressed in white for First Communion”. This “pious child” is “an explorer of mysteries”, who “has been mocked because of Swedenborg and the like nonsense”. This “pious child” is a student of Mickiewicz and an ardent reader of Jacob Boehme, “an heir of the mystical lodges” who confesses:

Not out of frivolity, most reverend theologians, I busied myself with the secret knowledge of many centuries, but out of the pain in my heart when I looked out at the atrocity of the world.⁴

The goal of the narrator of “Treatise on Theology” is defining his own position in theological discourse. This position, it seems, determines the style of the theological statements of the poet; this position, however, is the position of a poet, not of a theologian:

I thrash in the bed of my style, searching for a comfortable position, not too sanctimonious, and not too mundane.
There must be a middle place between abstraction and childishness where one can talk seriously about serious things.⁵

³ Ibid., 52.
⁴ Ibid., 53.
⁵ Ibid., 49.
However, I have an impression that this search for a middle place leads Miłosz to the construction of ‘the discourse of shame’ and ‘the discourse of acquiescence’, the first of them is presented through the pictures of the, so called, Polish Catholicism, and in a wider sense, Catholic rituals. The second one, the accepted on, is the language of “the secret knowledge”. And although the gesture of the moving aside of the narrative persona from ‘derisive’ masks of the contemporary culture is to be taken as a possibility, we should rather ask, why the protagonist of this text chooses “the secret knowledge”. And ask about his attitude to the community? It seems to me that these are crucial questions to understand not so much the religious stance, which is analysed by Miłosz in his text, but, maybe, to understand the religious stance of contemporary man, who will not be pushed into the area of atheism and indifference, but is reluctant to stick to historical (in another text Miłosz used the term ‘horizontal’) aspects of Christianity (which are, to be more exact, communal aspects).

1. “Catholic dogma is a few inches too high”

This is one of the fundamental answers of Miłosz, when we are going to analyse the reasons for the narrator’s leanings towards “the secret knowledge”. Dogma is “well armoured against reason” and as far as Miłosz’s arguments could be understood, this “armouring of dogma” is responsible for the situation in which we can speak either about “the inadequacy of the human tongue”—this is the stance of “gray-haired theologians” or we fall into “prattling on about soft little Jesus in the hay of His manger”—the stance of, in short, Polish Catholics.

If the dilemma is presented in this way, the poet, in a sense, has no choice. He cannot accept the first option (as he is a poet, that is one who uses “human language”), while the second option is alien to him, as it leads to infantilization (or, such a form of it which would not be acceptable to him, because—as we have seen—a certain form of infantilization is acceptable to him). This infantilization marks a bashful “shadow” of the Catholic doctrine, the shadow of incomprehensible dogmas. Miłosz discusses this shadow at length,
indicating that, maybe, it is this fear of, or reluctance towards “prattle”, which is the reason for his interest in “the secret knowledge”.

2. “My Polish compatriots have always liked the language of ritual and disliked theology”

The dilemma Milosz created is to contrast theology with rituals. His co-religionists are “Polish Catholics”. He devotes quite a few ascerbic remarks to them, trying to carefully define his position in relation to them.

This position is shown by “duty as a poet to flatter popular imaginings”. His relationship with this community (or rather his lack of a relationship) is defined through a simple and clear metaphor:

Perhaps I was like a monk in a mid-forest monastery
who, seeing from his window a river in flood,
wrote a treatise in Latin, a language entirely incomprehensible
to peasants in their sheepskin coats.⁴

This is, therefore, a situation of loneliness and of alienation; we have here traces of a quite traditional topos: a poet aside from a community (for example “Muza” (“A Muse”) by Jan Kochanowski); there also exists a possibility of reading this text as an example of the traditional formula of a medieval ‘clerk’; of an intellectual confronting a community. And something else is present in Milosz’s vision of the world: reluctance towards the Polish community (its landscape, disasters, etc), which is particularly clearly seen in the poems written after WWII, for example in “Faust Warszawski” (“Warsaw Faust”), where in the discussion about vaguely discussed arguments⁵ “consciousness” is given as a fundamental aspect of alienation. And,

⁴ Ibid., 48.
⁵ Ibid., 64.
⁶ Ibid., 48.
⁷ I have used the word “vaguely” because the narrator’s position towards his community is ambivalent. Moreover, this “consciousness” is of unclear origin; it may an individual value (Promethean, ruined, better knowing), but it may be a reference to the Marxist category of a ‘false consciousness’.
most probably, there is also an aspect of modernist dandyism in Miłosz’s understanding of the role of a writer...

Putting the author of the treatise beyond “inveterate lesion of humiliation/which had issued in this compensatory tribal rite”⁹ places him in relation to the community. His position is lonely, individual, independent

I used to turn for help to the Virgin Mary,
but I had difficulty recognizing her
in the deity elevated into the gilded fretwork of altars.¹¹

And in a different fragment:

And Roman Catholicism, is it not better to leave it alone?
So that the custom of sprinkling holy water is preserved, and
the observations of holidays, and carrying the dead to carefully
 tended cemeteries.¹²

The narrator, removed from the community, does not, however, treat this situation in terms of pride and prejudice; he is more apt to see an immoral aspect of this situation:

The opposition, I versus they, seemed immoral.
It meant I considered myself better than they were.¹³

What is more, Miłosz’s narrator is not happy with this situation; on the contrary; he perceives it as his disadvantage, and at the same time clearly shows that this situation has made him write “Treatise on Theology”; as if this reluctance to accept the theology of his co-religionists and towards co-religionists themselves (connected with the sin of pride, as he himself admits) was the spiritus movens of “Treatise on Theology”. However, is this dichotomy ‘community-loneliness’ a sensible ‘theological’ proposal (not necessarily from

⁹ Czesław Miłosz, Second Space, op. cit., 47.
¹⁰ Ibid., 49.
¹¹ Ibid., 50.
¹² Ibid., 47.
the perspective of Miłosz’s biography, but from a more general, cognitive perspective?

Miłosz’s reasoning constructs a somewhat simplified dilemma: either a ritual religiosity or theological thinking. This leads to a dilemma which is (in my opinion) only apparent: either routine of faith, ritual, rites, or theology, that is, thinking about God, evil, man.

A remark on the margin: I have tried to find out what were Miłosz’s grounds for formulating this dichotomy. Reading many of his texts from various periods shows, unfortunately, that he most probably had no intellectual foundations for such a dichotomy. What we have is either confessions of the type of sighs of an immature youth: “I was the prisoner of a dilemma: either immersion in movement, or inertia, which in simple terms means my reluctance to have curtains, refrigerators, TV, and to reading St. Thomas on Sundays.” Or more a extended reflection on Catholicism (particularly in its Polish version), which at closer look turns out to be a quasi-intellectual development of the youth’s rebellion.

It is worth considering the value of Miłosz’s reflections in this matter and move a bit beyond “Treatise on Theology”.

Miłosz wrote many times on Catholicism. In the essay “Wychowanie katolickie” (“A Catholic Upbringing”) he wrote:

“Tie [reverend Chomski, his teacher of religion] represented in the extreme way the thesis of the Catholic Church, that we cannot get closer to God otherwise than through our senses, that the faith and virtue of an individual are functions of the behaviour of the whole community. While going to Mass, celebrating sacraments, even against our will, we absorb the style […] Because people are weak, it would be madness to let them go on their own and hope that they will on their own, against the style which is surrounding them, achieve

14 Nieściiola w Brunnen [1953], in Metafsyczna pauza, ed. by Joanna Gromek, Kraków 1995, 27.
union with God. This union should be made easier, even if it is only for a few people, by creating in masses conditional reflexes.\textsuperscript{15}

The very process itself is not, ultimately, the reason which throws suspicion at Catholicism (Milosz was too astute an observer of human weaknesses not to agree with this educational safeguard which the Catholic church offers to man), although Milosz could not refrain from adding straight away: “In order to fully perform his [rev. Chomski’s] will, he had the authority of his position. It was the position not much different which later in the schools of central and eastern Europe was given to lecturers of Marxism-Leninism”.\textsuperscript{16} This is an old rhetorical problem of analogies, it is hard not to see the pervasive nature of this analogy, which ultimately leads to the equation of Marxism-Leninism and Catholicism.

Milosz wrote, from a different perspective in the essay “O katolicyźmie” (“On Catholicism”):

[...] difficulties which imagination must overcome in order to warm and to enliven religious symbols, may not be the least important reason for the triumphs of the statement, which is not in favour of private considerations but demands, or has demanded so far primarily obedience. It is safer in Catholicism, the decision is not so much about faith as about submission or rebellion to authority: responsibility is removed and the faithful complies: kneels, stands up, kneels again, signs, takes Holy Communion, in the festive mood, separated from herself/himself.\textsuperscript{17}

The ritual character of Catholicism (such a phrase appears many times in Milosz’s writings) was rejected by Milosz also from another, more Polish perspective. Again, a key to its rejection may be the biographical musings of Milosz, but also the following train of ideas:

\textsuperscript{15} Wychowanie katolickie, in Metafizyczna pauza, op. cit., 39.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 40.
\textsuperscript{17} O katolicyźmie, in Metafizyczna pauza, op. cit., 78.
Catholicism (alias!\textsuperscript{18}) in Polish history means Polish Catholicism. "Religion rarely is for them [Poles] an internal experience. Most often it is a set of obligations grounded in tribal habits and superstitions, and as a result they are, all the time, prisoners of Plato's Social Animal."\textsuperscript{19} In this essay Miłosz explained the history of this Polish character of Polish Catholicism, pointing to nineteenth-century history (although in many other texts he went back as far as the sixteenth century). The Polish situation might be described as follows: "Where it is impossible to define what is a national and what is a religious custom, religion is transformed into power which is social, conservative and conformist."\textsuperscript{20}

Where rituals rule, the community (described as shallow) is on top. Both these tendencies of reading Catholicism (on the one hand as a dominance of rituals over thinking, masses over an individual, inertia over activities, and on the other of a dangerous bond of Polishness with the Catholic Church) converge in the final essay "Wychowanie katolickie" ("Catholic Upbringing") in an exclamation of a rebelling poet: "I have promised myself that I will not enter into a covenant with Polish Catholicism—not necessarily using this term—that is, that I will not surrender to apes."\textsuperscript{21}

This quotation, given by Miłosz as his final argument, shows how much his attitude and ideas were shaped by his personal experiences, at times decorated in a formula of intellectual considerations. Alas, they are conducted on very high a level of generalization and declaration, not on intellectual resolutions of the highest quality.

\textsuperscript{18} The word "niestety" (" alas") was used by Miłosz in "Metafizyczna pauza czyli pyrania i odowiezli" ("Metaphysical Pause or Questions and Answers:" "Alas, the word religio is connected with religo, to bind. Therefore: a bond. It is a pity, but there does not exist, for example, one Catholicism ", in: \textit{Metafizyczna pauza}, op. cit., 89.

\textsuperscript{19} Wychowanie katolickie, op. cit., 51.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 49.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 55. One should not be offended by these "apes". Miłosz called in this way people who went to the Catholic mass in St. George church in Vilnius, the so called higher classes

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Let us return to the treatise: it seems that in the proposed dilemma there is a certain logically dangerous situation: because if we agree to follow Miłosz’s way of thinking, if we remained inside of this dilemma which does not have to be real and which we do not have to agree with (and Miłosz himself does not have the slightest intention of convincing us about it, choosing the strategy of confession over dissertation), so if we agreed to be inside this dilemma, then is it not so that we must get as far as Mickiewicz, Jakob Boehme and «the secret knowledge» because there are no other options inside this dilemma?

3. “Jakob Boehme believed that the visible world arose…”

When we remain inside Miłosz’s dilemma, then what we are left with is “the secret knowledge” and endless retelling of what this or another mystic or charlatan or man who has seen ‘truth’ has written. What we remain with is poetic theology, to which Miłosz subscribes (or, maybe, which he attempts to create). Because if the Roman Catholic dogma “is a few inches too high” and theology cannot cope with it, and “child’s prattle” awaits malignantly, then we are sentenced to the fairy tales and fables of various visionaries. As Miłosz writes, we do it “not out of frivolity”, but “out of the pain”. What are we searching for? For an answer to the dilemma, intriguing and as old as the world itself. “If God is all powerful, he can allow all this only if he is not good.”

Poetic theology is mythological theology. Therefore, the non-discursive treatises of various ‘initiated’ become so important: For a theologian who is accustomed to understanding his profession as an intellectual work, what sort of import might such information have?:

According to Mickiewicz and Jakob Boehme, Adam was like Adam Kadmon of the Kabbalah, the Cosmic Man in the bosom of Deity.

Or the confession:

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22 Czesław Miłosz, Second Space, op. cit., 54.
23 Ibid., 53.
24 Ibid., 55.
Jakob Boehme believed that the visible world arose as the effect of a catastrophe. [...]\textsuperscript{25}

Or, in a different fragment, where Original Sin is explained differently through the mythology of culture:

So it looks as if Original Sin
Is just a Promethean dream about man. [...]\textsuperscript{26}

The narrator of “Treatise on Theology” does not bother to give us reasons for which we are to believe in the fairy tales of some Jakob Boehme, Swedenborg, or Mickiewicz. Moreover, for the narrator the explanation of the arguments of “heretics, kabbalists, alchemists, the Knights of the Rose Cross” is absolutely beyond his area of interest.

Well, this may be not quite so, because Miłosz sends us a signal as to why it is ‘them’ he has selected, when he mentions Mickiewicz and the fact that his mystical gibberish might be made to look more reasonable because Mickiewicz is made trivial by aficionados of a “can of preserves”. This is just a shadow of explanation; so meagre and crippled. However, for Miłosz’s narrator, for some reason, it is important that Miłosz in his youth visited the manor house in Szczorsy and got initiated into some rituals while reading Boehme. Why should this be so important?

This question is obviously not a proper one (because, after all, we are dealing here with this Jakob Boehme and with this Mickiewicz). However, a reader of “Treatise on Theology” is haunted by it. Why should we, after all, accept such a vision of what is veiled? Why not other visions? Why not accept other answers?

Miłosz considers in his texts things which are veiled, and that is why he turns towards poetic imagination, the imagination of poets and visionaries (he even uses Jungian language when he writes about Boehme’s “world of archetypes”), and in a somewhat apocryphal move he attempts to fill an empty space with ‘theories’ of Adam Kadmon, a myth of the Original Sin, putting Adam on the level of nature, etc.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 59.
Why this particular knowledge? We know that it is the result of the pain of the world, the result of compassion, the result of observations of laws of nature and a rebellion against them. It does not, however, alter the fact of asking about this particular way of explaining anxieties.

Drawing in consecutive parts, consecutive conceptualizations of his narrator, he shows him as an avid reader of Frazer’s explanations, an absolute and fulfilled historian of religion, who is adept at writing at the level of myths, and at the same time he is absolutely removed from reality. Why does this narrator, we ask Miłosz, remain on the side of poetic fairy tales?

4. “I am not, and I do not want to be, a possessor of the truth” 27

This confession, opening the third part of “Treatise on Theology”, allows us to understand one of the key reasons for the epistemological decisions of the narrator. We already know that in certain sense they are fuelled by his idiosyncratic treatment of the community; and also the rules of the style he is using, and also—as discussed above—by a false and falsifying dilemma “theology or prattle”, and finally about man’s fallen nature, dragged down from the heights to the level of nature (because the narrator’s stance could be explained by the myth presented in the poem). However, on the discursive level we only get the confession quoted above: this defining of the narrator’s will points to one dimension of an answer. Why, however, does the narrator not want to possess truth? Why is he destined to “wandering on the outskirts of heresy”? 28

The answer is … surprising in its naivety and—I would say—deeply ‘deconstructing’ an attitude of “lover of the secret knowledge”:

In order to avoid what people call “the serenity of faith”, which is, after all, merely self-satisfaction. 29

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27 Ibid., 48.
28 Ibid., 48.
29 Ibid., 48.
This answer is surprising, but is true; after all it is—maybe since modernism—the most common platitude from the ‘initiated’ of our times. But let us go deeper as we listen to Miłosz. Why is he so afraid of this “serenity of faith”? Oh yes, it is because of the simple misconception I have pointed to before: from the contrasting of deep faith with “church rituals”, from creating a dichotomy out of them, from the conviction that rites and rituals negate this deep faith. Such a rejection therefore leads to rejection of ritual faith and makes him wander “on the outskirts of heresy”. In another fragment Miłosz argues that he has firm control over the things and ideas he writes about, when he sentenced his narrator to “the hell of artists” and mentions “pride” so many time. However, it is not “pride”, or even the reference to Lucifer’s condition, this is a rejection of: these are also myths of some kind, beautiful and tragic blankets which he gives his narrator to wear. When, however, one patiently puts these bellicose mythologies away and reaches for the kernel, one will see there an ordinary fault in thinking and banal misunderstanding, a childish logical error, on which the whole grand mythology is based. This mythology is obviously heretical, Manichean. It appears to have intellectual weight, but even if it is intellectually proficient, it is based on a banal error, so it is difficult to call it convincing.

But is it intellectually proficient, as it has no justification, apart from the bohemian will of the narrator?

5. “[…]he was writing in cipher/And that this was a rule of poetry […]”

This sentence is Miłosz’s explanation of the reasons for his fascination with Mickiewicz, that is the fascination with the mythological path. Mythological religion, as it seems, in order to be attractive must be mysterious and alluring. So an important element of it must be …. initiation. Why?

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30 Ibid., 48.
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[...] The distance between what we know and what we reveal. In other words it's what's inside the shell that matters. And it's all right if readers play with shells.31

The secret knowledge... What is the reason for craving to be a member of an elite club of “better, deeper knowing”? I have been mocked because of Swedenborg and like nonsense, For I transgressed the rules of literary fashion.32

In these words Miłosz makes a brave revelation and directly uses banalities of mythological choices, the choices of "the secret knowledge". Somewhere at the bottom there is contempt for "them" (readers) and a sense of superiority, independence from ‘literary fashions’, and in this way Miłosz’s search for "the secret knowledge" ends with the confession of a literary combatant.

“Treatise on Theology” read in this way becomes a fervent deconstruction of mythological tactics, and shows the weakness and triviality of a march towards things apparently deep, which are in fact based either on misunderstandings or on literary ambitions. For the only mythological value of (pardon my words) the gibberish of some Boehmes and Mickiewicz es turns out to be their ‘cryptic’ nature, ambiguity, obscurity, darkness, which offer a chance to lead astray from rituals and the ritualistic way of religious thinking.

However, the paper world of poetic mythlogy undergoes here a test of reality; the sign of this reality is for Miłosz “homo ritualis”, but mostly the ultimate perspective—death—strongly stressed in this poem. This perspective—in a sense, as an emissary of reality—dilutes the paper world of poetic visions, explaining the unexplainable: it even brings back the feeling of community leading to—maybe temporary, but nevertheless real—'overcoming the contradiction/between my private religion and the religion of the rite'.33

31 Ibid., 52.
32 Ibid., 52.
33 Ibid., 63.
It is telling that the narrator ends his way not on “Swedenborg and like nonsense,” but in the crowd in the crowd of singing “before a statue of Holy Mary, as she appeared to the young girl in Lourdes.”54 Thanks to this, Miłosz’s “Treatise on Theology” ends with the perspective of an exit, of an opening, of a chance of an escape from mythological religion into the real world. Because it is where “Treatise on Theology” ends that the real world begins.

54 Ibid., 63.